The CEEC government can affect the pace of enterprise restructuring through expenditures on targeted credit subsidies. The success of a set of accession policies will be driven largely by the interaction between those policies and the process by which landowners shift their holdings between large and small enterprises, and undertake costly investments to improve efficiency. To formalize this no~on, we suppose that land is held in one of four “states” representing different organizational forms, and that landowners can switch their holdings between states at some cost. In considering whether to effect such a switch, landowners balance the potential benefits of higher returns in a different state against the costs of switching. In the absence of a well-developed market in long term credit, however; farmers are not able to carry out all restructuring investments that would generate positive net benefits in expectation. We make the limiting assumption that markets provide no access to long-term credit; absent government aid, farmers are able to undertake restructuring only in those cases where the expected benefits will exceed restructuring costs in the year of the transition. Simulation experiments were performed on the model calibrated to data and estimated parameters for the Czech Republic drawn from a variety of sources. The Czech Republic was selected as the subject of the simulation experiments due to the availability of a variety of data sources for the Czech agricultural sector,hydroponic dutch buckets encompassing both basic statistical compendia and summary analyses.
Wage rates in agricultural enterprises are drawn from official statistical sources . Data on agricultural labor force participation and capital usage are based on Ratinger and Fischer . Ratinger provides information about the size distribution of farms, national output, tariff rates, national food consumption, farm profits, and other national aggregates. Elasticities of production were based on estimates by Ratinger and Fischer , normalized to correspond to evidence that farming exhibits constant returns to scale. Information about levels of public investment were drawn from publications of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development . CAP policy parameters, including threshold and intervention prices for cereals, are drawn from Weyerbrock . The model is designed to answer general, “big picture” questions about the effect of government policies on developments in the agricultural sector rather than detailed questions about the varying effects on d1fferent crops, growing regions, and so forth. It therefore treats all production as aggregated into one measure of output. We use the cereal grains as a proxy for all crops when carrying out calculations on production levels and prices. When converting between national aggregate measures and measures specific to the cereals sector, we apply a conversion factor reflecting the fraction of cereals in the total value of Czech production . In the absence of comprehensive farm-level data on production efficiency, several model parameters had to be calibrated to the available data. Total factor productivity parameters were derived from the production function [equation ] using the data on total output and factor A intensities described above.
The parameters b and b governing the size of the CEEC and EU grain markets and , respectively were likewise calibrated from available price and quantity figures using an own-price elasticity of demand for food of -0.3. The costs of enterprise restructuring, and the effectiveness of nondistortive government support for agriculture in lowering production and restructuring costs, are exploratory estimates.13, 14 The constructed model was used to explore a set of questions concerning the effect of various government policies on outcomes in the CEECs’ agricultural sectors. These experiments . . consider policy issues of short-, medium-, and long-tenn importance: price and output stability, farm enterprise restructuring, and convergence with EU nonns. The experiments focus on the interaction between policies that CEEC governments adopt in the current transitional period, and the policies that will apply during the first few years of the CAP. Four sets of pre-accession policies are considered: a laissez-faire approach, a gradual convergence of policy to EU norms, an immediate implementation of “CAP-like” policies, and an activist approach focusing ori targeting government intervention to nondistortive interventions. For each of these policy paths, the effect on prices and output ; on farm enterprise restructuring; and on the welfare of producer, consumers, and society overall, is investigated. We then examine the effect of accession to the EU in 2001, under alternative assumptions about the form of the accession contract. Taking as given the state of the economy after the implementation of a consistent transitional policy, the effects associated with full admission to an unreformed CAP; with a two-tier CAP system; and with a no-entry scenario are examined. In this set of experiments, the CEEC government follows the advice of “Big Bang” advocates, addressing the agricultural sector with a “hands-off’ approach during the 1993-2000 period. No expenditures on credit subsidies, public goods, or intervention purchases are incurred. The sole protection granted the market is a modest 20% tariff on imports. The result is stagnation.
Inefficient producers, lacking any access to long-term credit, and able to borrow for the short term only at usurious rates of interest, are unable to generate the surpluses necessary to undertake efficiency-enhancing investments. The restructuring process barely moves forward; the only notable changes in farm organization come as already-healthy small farms merge into larger units in search of economies of scale . As land is under the control of inefficient production units, output remains low, and prices are governed by the need to purchase expensive imports and to make up for domestic shortfalls . Since the CEEC is presumed to accede to the European Union in 2001, the fate of the agricultural sector in the period after 2001 is affected by the treatment of agriculture under the treaties of accession. Here three possibilities are explored. Full entry to CAP: Under this scenario the CEEC government adopts a set of policies to bring its agricultural sector into alignment with the CAP, adopting high tariffs on imports from outside the community, and a support price equal to that prevailing in the West. The CEEC government therefore targets its support for agriculture toward maintaining this price floor, rather than toward providing public goods or support for the restructuring process. Since laissez-faire pre-accession policies failed to generate a thriving farming sector, production after accession does not meet domestic demand. CAP entry also involves the loss of tariff revenue for the government, fails to restart the stalled restructuring process,bato bucket and creates little improvement in agricultural social welfare . In sum, this scenario demonstrates how the full potential benefits of accession can fail to be realized if farmers are unable to prepare for accession by undertaking efficiency enhancing investments. Two-tiered CAP: The small government expenditure on targeted supports shows up as a modest increase in output, a slight movement in restructuring, and consequent increases in producer surplus that make the change welfare-improving overall. No entry to CAP: Outcomes are little changed from those above. Thus, entry to CAP with an unreformed production sector creates almost no impact on prices, levels of output, or overall welfare . The overall message of these experiments is that a “hands-off’ free market approach to the pre-accession period, as proposed by advocates of “Big Bang” policies, fails to create conditions for restructuring, virtually precluding the realization of gains from eventual accession. Entry to CAP without appropriate pre-accession policies creates little improvement in economic outcomes. In this set of experiments, CEEC governments anticipate accession to the EU by instituting preaccession policies that converge gradually with those that will prevail after accession. Thus, price supports and tariff rates are slowly increased over the period, 1993-2000. In addition, the government expends funds on public goods and restructuring subsidies at modest levels during this transition period. We explore two possibilities, one in which the final accession contract to which the economy converges involves full entry into the CAP, and a second in which the accession contract is a two-tiered version of the CAP, as described above.
We also include a modest budget for public goods and restructuring subsidies. As the price floor and tariff protection start to bind in 1997-98, output surges, generating producer surpluses large enough to finance restructuring investments. Taking advantage of the restructuring subsidies, farmers move essentially all land held in “inefficient” states into efficient states, so that by 1998 the inefficiency associated with the legacy of socialism has been squeezed out of the system . As production continues to climb, government spending increases, creating a drag on total social welfare. The EU entry has little effect on these patterns, and there is very little difference in outcomes between the two-tier and full-entry scenarios. Full entry into CAP does involve slightly higher government expenditure on price supports and slightly lower total welfare as a result, but these differences are quite small. Comparing the gradual convergence policy and the laissez-faire approach, the effect most immediately apparent is the difference in the degree of farm restructuring. Consumer surplus after 2001 is independent of the choice of pre-accession policies, since in both instances the prevailing prices are set by a binding government-imposed floor. However, the combination of modest price supports and non-distortive interventions creates the conditions for farmers to improve production efficiency and generate large gains in producer surplus, thus increasing total welfare, even with the modest increase in expenditures needed to maintain the price supports. Pre-accession policies, rather than trading opportunities, are the most important determinants of this improvement. In this set of simulation experiments, we consider pre-accession policies that seek to bring agricultural supports into immediate alignment with those that will prevail after the accession period. Price floors and tariff rates are raised to CAP levels starting in 1993, and the CEEC government makes no expenditures on non-distortive supports. We again explore two possible forms of the accession contract, one involving full entry into the CAP in 2001, and a second in which a two-tier system is implemented. Comparing these results with those for the laissez-faire baseline, the immediate difference is that restructuring happens rapidly . The price supports and market protections act as a form of credit subsidy, allowing for rapid reorganization of inefficient agricultural enterprises into efficient holdings. As a result, output jumps. -As prices are supported, these increases lead to gains in producer surplus which are overshadowed by sharper increases in government spending. Overall, however, outcomes are superior to those associated with laissez-faire policies, for the same reasons as state above: The key is to find a mechanism to finance restructuring. Side-by-side comparisons of the full CAP scenarios, one preceded by laissez-faire, the second by immediate implementation, show large improvements in social welfare associated with CAP-like pre-accession policies . Comparing the full CAP with the two-tier CAP shows modest differences. As might be expected, higher price supports place more cash into the hands of farmers more rapidly, and therefore induces faster enterprise restructuring, and hence generally higher levels of output and, of course, higher prices. Spending on public goods, in the two-tier version of CAP, shows up in higher levels of output in the long-run. Overall social welfare is slightly higher under the two tier regime than under the full CAP system. In this section, we consider a set of scenarios in which pre-accession policies target support at non-distorting interventions in the market. Government resources are targeted to the provision of public infrastructure that reduces production costs, and to subsidies for long-term credit.15 We again consider three policy regimes that might apply to agriculture after accession to the EU: full entry to CAP, entry to a two-tiered version of CAP, and no entry. In the pre-accession period, restructuring takes place somewhat more slowly than in the other scenarios we have considered. However, the availability of long-term credit eventually drives all land into the control of efficient producers. In fact, the takeover of the large, efficient farms is, by the year 2000, almost absolute . The increased efficiency of production allows for a sharp rise in output, turning the country from an importer to an exporter. Prices nonetheless remain low and stable, dictated more by competition with world markets than by government supports. Low and stable market prices generate large consumer surpluses. Producer surplus increases during the simulation period, reflecting the benefits to farmers of reduced production costs.